The recent Colombian peace negotiations took the art and science of negotiating transitional justice to unprecedented levels of complexity. For decades, the Colombian government fought a bitter insurgency war against FARC guerrilla forces. After protracted negotiations, the two parties reached a peace deal that took account of the rights of victims. As first-hand participants in the talks, and principal advisers to the Colombia government, Mark Freeman and Iván Orozco offer a unique account of the mechanics through which accountability issues were addressed. Drawing from this case study and other global experiences, Freeman and Orozco offer a comprehensive theoretical and practical conception of what makes the ‘devil’s dilemma’ of negotiating peace with justice implausible but feasible.

The recent Colombian peace negotiations took the art and science of negotiating transitional justice to unprecedented levels of complexity. For decades, the Colombian government fought a bitter insurgency war against FARC guerrilla forces. After protracted negotiations, the two parties reached a peace deal that took account of the rights of victims. As first-hand participants in the talks, and principal advisers to the Colombia government, Mark Freeman and Iván Orozco offer a unique account of the mechanics through which accountability issues were addressed. Drawing from this case study and other global experiences, Freeman and Orozco offer a comprehensive theoretical and practical conception of what makes the ‘devil’s dilemma’ of negotiating peace with justice implausible but feasible.