Moral Rationalism and Shari’a Independent rationality in modern Shi’i usul al-Fiqh 1st Edition – PDF/EPUB Version Downloadable

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Author(s): Ali-Reza Bhojani
Publisher: Routledge
ISBN: 9781138800267
Edition: 1st Edition

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Description

Moral Rationalism and SharÄ«’a is the first attempt at outlining the scope for a theological reading of SharÄ«’a, based on a critical examination of why ‘Adliyya theological ethics have not significantly impacted ShÄ«’Ä« readings of SharÄ«’a. Within ShÄ«’Ä« works of SharÄ« ‘a legal theory (usÅ«l al-fiqh) there is a theoretical space for reason as an independent source of normativity alongside the Qur’ān and the Prophetic tradition. The position holds that humans are capable of understanding moral values independently of revelation. Describing themselves as ‘Adliyya (literally the people of Justice), this allows the ShÄ« ‘a, who describe themselves as ‘Adiliyya (literally, the People of Justice), to attribute a substantive rational conception of justice to God, both in terms of His actions and His regulative instructions. Despite the ShÄ«’Ä« adoption of this moral rationalism, independent judgments of rational morality play little or no role in the actual inference of SharÄ« ‘a norms within mainstream contemporary ShÄ«’Ä« thought. Through a close examination of the notion of independent rationality as a source in modern ShÄ«’Ä« usÅ«l al-fiqh, the obstacles preventing this moral rationalism from impacting the understanding of SharÄ« ‘a are shown to be purely epistemic. In line with the ‘emic’ (insider) approach adopted, these epistemic obstacles are revisited identifying the scope for allowing a reading of SharÄ«’a that is consistent with the fundamental moral rationalism of ShÄ«’Ä« thought. It is argued that judgments of rational morality, even when not definitively certain, cannot be ignored in the face of the apparent meaning of texts that are themselves also not certain. An ‘Adliyya reading of SharÄ«’a demands that the strength of independent rational evidence be reconciled against the strength of any other apparently conflicting evidence, such that independent judgments of rational morality act as a condition for the validity of precepts attributed to a just and moral God.